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Abstract
We present a model of altruistically-minded yet rational players contributing
to a public good. A key feature is the tension between altruism and crowding-
out e¤ects (playerse¤orts are strategic substitutes). We nd that more altruistic
behaviour can raise or reduce welfare, depending on the ne details of the environment.
It is almost always optimal for a player to act more selshly than her true preference.
We discuss applications to a range of public good problems, including global climate
policy. Our results highlight that it may be di¢ cult to infer social preferences from
observed behaviour.
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1 Introduction
There is a growing recognition that social preferences may play an important role in
explaining economic outcomes such as those arising in problems of public good provi-
sion.1 We study the welfare impact of unselsh behaviour by altruistically-minded yet
rational players, and ask to what extent a preference for altruism is optimally reected
in a players contribution to a public good. To our knowledge, this is the rst attempt in
the literature to understand a notion of optimal altruism.
Our analysis is motivated in part by recent experience with climate policy, which many
consider to be one of the biggest public good problems of today (Stern, 2008). Recent
years have witnessed a number of unilateral initiatives to combat climate change at the
local, national, and regional levels. These aim to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
with varying levels of ambition. For example, the EU has a program to reduce GHG
emissions by 20% (relative to 1990 levels) by 2020 while the UK aims to cut emissions by
80% by 2050.2 Such initiatives have taken place in the absence of a global agreement by
countries to jointly reduce emissions (e.g., with a global cap-and-trade scheme).
Relatedly, there is an increasing use of the social cost of carbon(SCC) in regulatory
decision-making. The SCC reects the marginal benet to the world from reducing CO2
emissions rather than only to an individual country or region. Several European countries
have already applied the SCC (Watkiss and Hope 2012), and the US has also developed
a measure of the SCC (Greenstone, Kopits and Wolverton, 2013) which to date has been
applied to selected energy and environmental regulations. At the same time, many other
countries do not incorporate the SCC in policymaking, and do not appear to have engaged
in emissions abatement beyond business-as-usual.
There is evidence that the domestic costs associated with some unilateral policies
exceed domestic benets. For example, Tols (2012) cost-benet analysis of the European
Unions 20/20/2020 policy package nds a benet-cost ratio less than unity across a
range of scenarios. In a similar vein, the UKs Department of Energy and Climate Changes
impact assessment of the 2008 Climate Change Act notes the benets of UK action will
be distributed across the globe and nds the economic case for the UK continuing to
act alone where global action cannot be achieved would be weak(DECC 2009).
It is di¢ cult to reconcile these unilateral initiatives with standard economic theory,
including the theory of international environmental agreements (Barrett 1994, 2005). Put
simply, if unilateral action by local, national, or regional actors reduces their own domes-
tic welfare, then why are they doing it? But it seems possible that some of these climate
initiatives may be a reection of unselshor altruisticmotives, in the sense of incor-
porating benets that accrue outside the borders of the acting jurisdiction. This paper
seeks to understand the role that altruism can play in such public goods problems.3
1See Sobel (2005) for an overview of interdependent preferences in economic analysis.
2Similiar climate-policy initiatives, many on a relatively small scale, also exist, for example, in Australia,
California, China, Japan, New Zealand and Norway, as well as at the city level.
3Our analysis here focuses on international altruismbetween countries rather than intergenerational
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Our analysis begins with a two-player model of (non-cooperative) public good provision
with the following key features. A players net benet or national welfarek (k = i; j)
equals the benet she derives from total contributions to the public good (by both players)
minus the cost of her own contribution, while global welfareW = i + j . Preferences
may depart from self-interest: We assume that a players true objective function Sk =
(1   k)k + kW places weight on both her own net benets and global welfare, where
k 2 [0; 1] represents her degree of altruism.4 More altruistic behaviour by player i leads
to an increase in its own public good contribution, such as a countrys level of CO2
abatement. But this crowds outplayer j and induces her to cut back, i.e., contributions
are strategic substitutes. We refer to the rate at which the other players e¤ort contracts
as the leakage rate. The tension between altruism and leakage lies at the core of our
analysis.
Consider the impact of a small unilateral commitment to more altruistic behaviour.
Suppose that players initially act entirely selshly, that is, each chooses the contribution
that maximizes her national welfare. Now player i raises her contribution by a small
amount, reecting an underlying altruistic preference as per her objective Si. Is a little
bit of altruism a good thing? Such a unilateral commitment by player i increases the
equilibrium net benet j enjoyed by the other player j but acting unselshly hurts her
own net benet i . We provide conditions in terms of is leakage rate, degree of altruism
i, and the relative marginal benets that the two players derive from the public good to
sign the overall e¤ect. A similar logic reveals that it is ambiguous how altruistic behaviour
a¤ects social welfare W  (Propositions 1 and 2). These initial ndings show that whether
altruism is welfare-augmenting depends crucially on the details of the environment; a
player may thus wish to nd ways of making public good contributions that depart from
her true objective.
Now consider another extreme: Suppose that player is true preference is entirely
altruistic, i = 1, while player j is altruistic only to some degree, j < 1. Should i make
the contribution that maximizes its underlying global-welfare objective? No. Intuitively,
a small decrease in its own contribution only leads to a second-order loss in global welfare
(by the envelope theorem). But the resulting induced increase in the other players e¤ort
altruismbetween di¤erent generations of people in a single economy. We di¤er from much of the other
literature on altruism in that we often think of our unit of analysis as a country rather than an individual.
Also, we do not wish to claim that social preferences are the only possible way of explaining unilateral
climate action. In some cases, other explanations, such as domestic political-economy considerations, may
be important.
4Our formulation of altruism has a continuum of preferences, ranging from entirely selsh to entirely
altruistic preferences. On a historical note, Edgeworth (1881) uses essentially the same formulation, by
writing Si = i + ij and calling i the coe¢ cient of e¤ective sympathy. Some other formulations of
altruism have conditional elements. For example, the models of inequity aversion due to Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) feature utility functions with reference points which determine
the degree of perceived inequity in payo¤s (and also a¤ect players actions, e.g., depending on whether
they are ahead or behind). Lange and Vogt (2003) show that a preference for equity can generate
cooperation in international environmental negotiations, while Kosfeld, Okada and Riedl (2009) argue that
fairness can play an important role in the formation of institutions geared towards improving public good
provision. See also Rabin (1993) on fairness in economic analysis.
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leads to a rst-order gain (whenever the other player is not already choosing the rst-best
e¤ort). This is what we call reverse leakage a weaker commitment reduces free-riding
by the other player, and this can raise social welfare. A player who genuinely wants to
maximize global welfare thus almost always does best (in terms of W ) by being at least
somewhat selsh.5
On this basis, we can characterize optimal altruistic commitments. To examine this,
we use a modelling device in form of a strategic objective function 
k = (1   k)k +
kSk, where k  0 is the players strategic preference. A player chooses a public good
contribution according to her true preference if k = 1, but whenever k < 1 (k > 1) acts
more (less) selshly than would be her true preference. We determine a players optimal
commitment k(i; j) to incorporate its altruism into public good contribution. One way
of thinking about how a player can commit to actions that depart from her true preference
(k 6= 1) is in terms of the theory of strategic delegation; for example, citizens may delegate
decision-making on abatement targets to politicians, and may wish to appoint politicians
whose climate-policy preference di¤ers from their own.6
We show that almost always k < 1 (for k = i; j), and, in a range of cases, 

i = 0
and/or j = 0. In other words, optimal altruism typically falls short of true preferences,
sometimes by a lot. For example, two countriesvoter preferences may be to apply the
global SCC to 80% and 30% of projects respectively, that is, (i; j) = (45 ;
3
10). But if
(i ; 

j ) = (
1
2 ;
1
6), say, then optimal altruism involves using the SCC only in 40% and
5% of projects. We thus highlight that caution is required in inferring whether or not a
player is being selshfrom its observed behaviour. Suppose it is observed or otherwise
estimated that a players e¤ort is entirely selsh. It does not follow that this players
underlying preference is to be completely selsh little or no additional e¤ort can be
consistent even with highly altruistic preferences (that is, i  0 but i i ' 0).
Our modelling approach is consistent with a characteristic shared by many (global)
public good problems: The absence of a world government means that solutions enforced
by a central mechanism designer play a limited role. Our exposition focuses on the ap-
plication to climate policy for three main reasons. First, there is signicant empirical
evidence that countriesCO2 abatement e¤orts are strategic substitutes: A large majority
of work on unilateral policy nds positive leakage rates, as in our model. Second, there
is a close mapping between altruism and two widely-used empirical concepts in climate
policy: Business-as-usualemissions correspond to entirely self-interested behaviour, and
use of the global social cost of carbon to entirely altruistic behaviour. Third, climate
policy is characterized by something close to a informational level playing eldbetween
5These basic insights rely on crowding-out e¤ects but not on whether leakage rates are highor low.
6The classic reference on delegation is Schelling (1960), and the idea has been applied widely to di¤erent
contexts such bargaining, political economy, monetary policy, and the theory of the rm. We are not aware
of any other models of delegation that feature altruistic preferences in a public-goods context. Perhaps
closest to us, though in a rather di¤erent setup without altruism, Roelfsema (2007) considers a model of
imperfect competition with strategic trade policies, in which delegation to a politician who cares more
about the environment than the median voter can be optimal because this induces other countries to do
the same. (This result relies on a particular form of competition in product markets.)
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countries: The climate-change debate is highly public and global (based, in part, on sci-
entic evidence) and countriesabatement policies are commonly known (perhaps with a
few exceptions), as is whether or not they have adopted the SCC.7
Questions of altruistic behaviour also arise in other environmental problems. For
example, there is an ongoing debate in the literature about the motivations behind the
Montreal Protocol to reduce chlorouorocarbons (CFCs) which deplete the ozone layer.
While Barrett (1994) argues that the protocol was broadly consistent with the outcome of
a non-cooperative game, Sunstein (2007) notes that the US used a relatively low discount
rate in evaluating its commitment which might be interpreted as a form of altruism.
The key features of our model are shared by other problems of the commons. For
example, in sheries policy, there is a strong tendency towards overexploitation; individual
players have a suboptimal incentive to limit their catch (Stavins 2011) and catch reductions
are typically strategic substitutes (e.g., Levrahi and Mirman 1980), leading to a leakage
problem analogous to ours. Similarly, in a classic paper, Olson and Zeckhauser (1966)
suggest that small countries tend to free-ride on the defense investments of large countries,
and observe that countriesmilitary expenditures are often strategic substitutes. It is more
di¢ cult to pinpoint altruism empirically in these applications, partly because there is no
clear equivalent to the adoption of the SCC. However, it seems conceivable that individual
European countries, say, also care about the welfare of the EU as a whole when it comes
to policies a¤ecting the environment or defense.8
Our results can also apply to problems from other domains that share public good
characteristics. For example, suppose family member j pursues some useful activity;
family member i derives indirect benets from the activity, and can help out at some cost.
If altruistic, i also cares about the benets accruing to j in choosing how much to help.
But the more i helps, the less j does himself the leakage problem. While is help always
raises js private payo¤, it need not raise overall welfare or is own altruistic objective.
Optimal altruism typically involves i < 1, so is help falls short of her true preference.9
To be concrete, a parent may want to help a child with its homework on 4 out of 5 days a
week (i = 45 , say), but realizes that, because of incentive e¤ects, 

i =
1
2 , say, is optimal
and thus only helps twice a week. In practice, such a well-meaning but stern commitment
may be achieved by putting certain rules into place, or the parent may engage a tutor (or
7 In practice, of course, there is also signicant overall uncertainty over the costs and benets of CO2
abatement, but the key point for us is that actions are easily observable and any informational asymmetries
between countries are small.
8A related application is the problem faced by large charities like the Bill & Melinda Gates or Rockefeller
foundations. It seems clear that the broad objective of such organizations is to enhance some measure of
global welfare. At the same time, there are well-known concerns that their contributions can crowd out
others, such as local governments, the private sector, and smaller charities. This corresponds quite directly
to the tension between altruism and leakage in our analysis.
9The rotten kid theorem (Becker 1974) does not apply in our model. It states that, under certain
conditions (Bergstrom 1989), an altruistic head who makes transfers to self-interested household members
induces the e¢ cient outcome despite limited altruism in the family overall. By contrast, our setup does
not feature a design with transfer payments (see also our concluding discussion in Section 7). (Recall also
that the rotten kid theorem itself can fail in public-good settings, despite transfers.)
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sibling) twice a week and abstain from helping directly.10
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up our benchmark
model and develops its key features. Section 3 examines the welfare impact of small
altruistic commitments. Section 4 analyzes in detail playersoptimal commitments.
Section 5 shows that our main results are robust in a variety of directions. This includes
the generalization to n  3 players where we exploit the fact that playerscontributions
are made in an aggregative game in the sense of Corchón (1994); moderate degrees
of cross-country cost spillovers (e.g., in renewable energy technologies such as solar or
wind); and di¤erent representations of altruism in playersobjective functions, including
the warm glowof Andreoni (1989, 1990). Thus, our results apply with both pureand
impureforms of altruistic preferences.
Section 6 points out some further properties of our model, with a focus on its empirical
implications: The impact of altruism on leakage rates, and the strategic properties of
playerspolicy commitments. Finally, Section 7 discusses recent climate policy initiatives
in light of our results, and o¤ers some suggestions for future research. (The proofs of our
results are in Appendix A, and the details of the robustness analysis are in Appendix B.)
2 A model of altruism in public good provision
Setup of the model. Two players, i and j, contribute to the provision of a public good.
Player k (k = i; j) makes a contribution (e.g., shared investment, emissions reduction, or
e¤ort) denoted by Xk, and derives benets Bk(Xi+Xj) which depend on the aggregate
e¤ort by the two players. The marginal benet satises B0k() > 0 and B00k() < 0. The cost
function Ck(Xk) is player-specic, with marginal cost satisfying C 0k() > 0 and C 00k () > 0.
To guarantee an interior solution, assume Ck(0) = C 0k(0) = 0 and B
0
k(Xk)   C 0k(Xk) < 0
for some Xk < 1. Dene a player ks net benet or national welfare as k =
Bk(Xi +Xj)  Ck(Xk), and social surplusor global welfareas W = i + j .
In our model, each players preferences may be at least partly altruistic. In particular,
player ks true objective function is given by
Sk = (1  k)k + kW , (1)
where the parameter k 2 [0; 1] represents her true preference for altruism. Player k
is purely self-interested if k = 0 (so Sk = k), and entirely altruistic if k = 1 (so
Sk = W ) in which case her preference reects the full global benet of contributions,
(Bi +Bj). More generally, a higher value of k represents a more altruisticpreference
that gives more weight to the other players net benet. For our application to climate
policy, we can interpret k = 0 as an underlying preference for the business-as-usual
(BAU) level of emissions, while k = 1 corresponds to a desire to incorporate the global
10Our model assumes the tutor is optimally chosen and incentivized by the parent (strictly speaking, at
zero cost) and has no special skills although this is clearly not essential for the results.
6
social cost of carbon(SCC) into decision-making.
We next introduce a modelling device in form of a strategic objective function:

k = (1  k)k + kSk. (2)
A strategic objective is a convex combination of a players net benet k and her true
objective Sk, with a relative weight given by the strategic preference k 2 [0;  1k ]. If
k = 0, the strategic objective is entirely selsh, so 
k = k (regardless of the underlying
true objective Sk). If k = 1, the players strategic objective is identical to her true
objective, so 
k = Sk. We restrict attention to k   1k , kk  1 to focus on
the typical situation where each player contributes too little to the public good from a
social-welfare perspective rather than too much. (Whenever k < 1, we do allow for the
possibility that k > 1 so the strategic objective could place more weight on altruism than
the true objective although we will see that, in equilibrium, this does not occur.)
This (i; j)-modelling device allows us to analyze the welfare impact of players fol-
lowing through on their altruistic preferences, and, building on this, to understand the
extent to which players optimally engage in altruistic behaviour. For example, a countrys
true preference k 2 [0; 1] reects its citizenspreferences towards climate change, such as
those of its median voter. Citizens delegate decision-making regarding abatement targets
to politicians, where di¤erent politicians represent di¤erent policies. For strategic reasons,
citizens may wish to elect politicians whose climate-policy preference di¤ers from their
own, that is k 6= 1.11
The timing of the model is as follows. At Date 0, each player is endowed with a
benet function and a cost function, Bk() and Ck(), as well as with a true objective
Sk() that reects her degree of altruism, k 2 [0; 1]. Then, at Date 1, each player chooses
her strategic preference k 2 [0;  1k ] to maximize her true objective Sk. Finally, at Date
2, each player or her agent chooses e¤ort according to the strategic objective function

k. (For environmental applications, a countrys choice of Xk is equivalent to choosing a
domestic price on emissions.12)
We focus on the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game, and follow the dele-
gation literature in assuming that playersstrategic objective functions, 
i and 
j , form
credible commitments.13 The plausibility of this assumption will, of course, vary de-
pending on the application in question. As explained in the introduction, we think that
11 In the literature on international environmental agreements, countries typically make a binary decision
on joining an agreement (in or out). By contrast, countries here choose the intensity of their commitment.
12To see this, imagine splitting country ks abatement decision at Date 2 into two parts. At Date 2b, a
representative, price-taking rm chooses emissions abatement Xk to maximize its prots pkXk  Ck(Xk),
where pk is the domestic emissions price, such that pk = C0k(Xk), in equilibrium. This denes an upward-
sloping abatement supply curve with dXk=dpk = 1=C00k (Xk) > 0. At Date 2a, policymakers choose the
domestic price pk to maximize the strategic objective 
k. This setup is exactly equivalent to the benchmark
model since choosing the domestic emissions price is equivalent to choosing an abatement e¤ort.
13This is essentially equivalent to assuming that playerscontributions are publicly observable, which,
in turn, corresponds to i knowing js jj when choosing her contribution policy at Date 2 (as benet and
cost functions are commonly known). (We do not require that i then knows js true underlying preference
j for altruism.)
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commitment value is reasonably likely to obtain in the climate-policy context, given some-
thing close to an informational playing eld between countries, and in other public good
problems.
Key properties of the model. We begin by establishing the key properties of the model
at Date 2. For player i, say, the rst-order condition for its contribution is
@
i=@Xi = (B
0
i   C 0i) + iiB0j = 0. (3)
The rst-best benchmark is nested where (i) both players have entirely unselsh true
preferences, i = j = 1, and (ii) both players choose their respective e¤ort levels accord-
ingly, i = j = 1. In this case, players at Date 2 make contribution decisions to maxXkW
(where k = i; j) thus each incorporating the full global benet of their actions.
The rst-order condition also denes player is best response to player js contribution,
Ri(Xj). The slope of this function is given by
R0i(Xj) =
B00i + iiB
00
j
( B00i + C 00i   iiB00j )
2 ( 1; 0). (4)
A key property of the model is that playerse¤orts are strategic substitutes. This captures
a crowding oute¤ect: If one player increases her e¤ort, this reduces the marginal benet
of e¤ort for the other player, who therefore responds by cutting back.
In the context of climate policy, Li  [ R0j(Xi)] 2 (0; 1) is the marginal rate of carbon
leakage(IPCC, 2007) resulting from country is e¤ort. Borrowing this terminology:
Lemma 1 The leakage rate due to player ks e¤ort is given by Lk 2 (0; 1).
Leakage rates quantify the severity of the crowding-out problem; they are positive but
less than 100%. This is a common feature of public good models across di¤erent domains,
including environmental problems, military protection, sheries, and charitable giving.
Although there are a few exceptions, this range also reects the very large majority of
existing theoretical and empirical work on carbon leakage.14
We next conrm the intuition that more altruistic behaviour by a player leads to an
increase in her e¤ort. (The result from Lemma 1 ensures that equilibrium is unique, stable,
and exhibits well-behaved comparative statics.)
Lemma 2 If player ks true preference k > 0, her e¤ort satises dXk=dk > 0.
A higher value of k inates the marginal return to public good contribution, which,
14Many empirical estimates are derived from numerical simulations of multi-sector, general equilibrium
models which focus on climate initiatives by OECD countries that result in carbon leakage to non-OECD
countries. These typically nd leakage in the range of 540%, with many estimates below 20%. Leakage
estimates for individual sectors (such as the cement and steel industries in the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme) are frequently higher but rarely exceed 100%. See Babiker (2005), Copeland and Taylor (2005),
Ritz (2009), and the references cited therein.
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by stability, also increases its equilibrium level. So an increase i, say, raises Xi (Lemma
2) and also raises Xi +X

j , but not by as much (Lemma 1).
To complete our preliminary discussion, we show that a player with an entirely selsh
true preference, k = 0, does not want to engage in a strategic commitment.
Lemma 3 If player ks true preference k = 0, her optimal e¤ort solves maxXk k.
As a notational convention, we refer to such an optimal commitment as k = 0.15
3 The welfare impact of small altruistic commitments
To build intuition, we begin our main analysis by considering smallcommitments. Sup-
pose that player is true preference i > 0 is altruistic at least to some extent (while j  0),
and that initially both players act purely in their self-interest, i.e., k = 0 for k = i; j.
What is the impact of a small commitment di > 0 by player i towards incorporating her
true altruistic preference in her public good contribution?
Proposition 1 The impact of a small unilateral commitment di > 0 by player i on her
equilibrium true objective
dSi
di

i=j=0
=
 
iB
0
j  B0iLi
 dXi
di

i=j=0
is (a) positive if the ratio of marginal benets satises B0i  B0j and her true preference
exceeds the leakage rate i > Li, and (b) negative for a ratio of marginal benets B0i=B
0
j
su¢ ciently large or for a true preference i su¢ ciently small.
Whether a small altruistic commitment is benecial for a player depends crucially on
the details of the environment. If she either derives a relatively large marginal benet, or
her true preference contains only a small degree of altruism, it is never a good idea for
someone to make such a commitment. However, two simple conditions which are jointly
su¢ cient for dSi > 0 are that the player has a relatively low marginal benet as well as
a true preference that exceeds the rate of leakage.
These results can be understood as follows. With a slight abuse of notation, let dXi > 0
denote the increase in is e¤ort due to its small unilateral commitment di > 0. (More
formally, dXi =
h
(dXi =di)i=j=0
i
di > 0 by Lemma 2.) Due to the crowding-out
e¤ect (Lemma 1), j adjusts its e¤ort by dXj = ( Li) dXi < 0 in response.
By the envelope theorem, the direct e¤ect of a small change in each players e¤ort on
its own net benet is zero. The reason is that both players were initially choosing their
15This convention makes an altruistic players strategic commitment directly comparable with a selsh
player; note that, if k > 0, then the contribution solves maxXk k if and only if k = 0. (Recall that we
are restricting attention to cases where k  0.)
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respective e¤orts selshly to maximize their own net benet, so any (small) change their
own contribution only has a second-order e¤ect.
However, the unilateral commitment by i also has two strategic e¤ects, one positive
and one negative. First, the increase in is e¤ort yields an increase in the benets enjoyed
by the other player j of B0jdX

i > 0. Second, the induced reduction in js e¤ort means
that is benet changes by B0idX

j = ( B0iLi) dXi < 0.
Player is true objective Si = i + ij places weight i 2 [0; 1] on the rst (positive)
strategic e¤ect and full weight on the second (negative) strategic e¤ect. The weighted
sum of these e¤ects, (iB0j   B0iLi)dXi , thus determines the impact of a small unilateral
commitment on its own true objective function and behaves according to Proposition 1.
Intuitively, a unilateral commitment by i increases the net benet j enjoyed by j
but acting unselshly hurts its own net benet i . The commitment thus enhances its
own true objective if (and only if) the former e¤ect outweighs the latter. The positive
e¤ect will be large if js marginal benet is large, and receives large weight according to
is degree of altruism, i. The negative e¤ect will be small if there is little leakage, and if
is own marginal benet is small.
We can also address when a small altruistic commitment improves global welfare:
Proposition 2 The impact of a small unilateral commitment di > 0 by player i on
equilibrium global welfare
dW 
di

i=j=0
=
 
B0j  B0iLi
 dXi
di

i=j=0
is (a) positive if the ratio of marginal benets satises B0i  B0j, and (b) negative for a
ratio of marginal benets B0i=B
0
j su¢ ciently large.
The logic underlying Proposition 2 follows that of Proposition 1. Once again, the
direct e¤ects on each players net benet are both zero by the envelope theorem. The
only di¤erence arises because, from a global-welfare perspective, the combined e¤ect of
the two strategic e¤ects depends on their unweighted sum. So the increase in the benets
enjoyed by the other player j of (B0j)dX

i > 0 plus the induced reduction in is benet
of [B0i ( Li)]dXi < 0 yield an overall welfare impact dW  = (B0j   B0iLi)dXi . Previous
arguments make clear that the sign of this expression, too, is ambiguous.16 However,
note also that Proposition 2(a) implies that a small commitment must be global welfare-
enhancing for at least one of the two players.
A small commitment, if it occurs, is of course more likely to raise global welfare than is
true objective. For example, with identical benet functions, Bi(Xi+Xj) = Bj(Xi+Xj),
is small commitment always raises equilibrium global welfare W  (Proposition 2, since
16Hoel (1991) obtains a similar result to our Proposition 2 in an early model of unilateral commitment
in environmental policy that does not feature social preferences.
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Li < 1) but its own true objective Si may still decline (Proposition 1, for i < Li).
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4 Optimal altruistic commitments
Our analysis thus far has shown that whether more altruisticcommitments are welfare-
augmenting depends on the ne details of the environment; this already suggests that
players may wish to make public good contributions in ways that depart from their true
objectives. We now turn to the general version of the model, in which each player chooses
optimally how altruistically to act so as to maximize her true objective Sk; this will yield
equilibrium values k(i; j) for playersstrategic preferences (k = i; j).
A generalized formula. This analysis is more complicated because our previous argu-
ment, based on the envelope theorem, that the two direct e¤ects of commitment are zero
no longer applies (since players no longer necessarily act selshly at the outset).
By Lemma 2, however, a small increase di > 0 in, say, is strategic preference (not
necessarily starting from i = 0), leads to an increase in its own e¤ort of dXi > 0. By
Lemma 1, j adjusts its e¤ort by dXj = ( Li) dXi < 0 in response.
The two strategic e¤ects of an additional commitment are also as before. First, the
increase in is e¤ort yields an increase in the benets enjoyed by the other player of
B0jdX

i > 0. Second, the induced reduction in js e¤ort means that is benet changes by
B0i ( Li) dXi < 0.
The direct e¤ect of a small change dXi in is e¤ort on its own net benet i, in general,
is equal to (B0i   C 0i)dXi . Using is rst-order condition from (3), this generalized direct
e¤ect can also be written as ( iiB0j)dXi  0. Similarly, the direct e¤ect of a small
(induced) change dXj on js net benet j is equal to (B
0
j  C 0j)dXj . Again, by its rst-
order condition, the generalized direct e¤ect equals ( jjB0i) dXj = (jjB0iLi) dXi  0.
The overall equilibrium impact of an incremental commitment by i on its true objective
Si = i + ij takes into account all of these e¤ects, with appropriate weights:
dSi = ( iiB0j)dXi| {z }
direct e¤ect
on player i (  0)
+
  B0iLi dXi| {z }
strategic e¤ect
on player i ( < 0)
+ i|{z}
true altruism
of player i ( 2 [0; 1])
 [  jjB0iLi dXi| {z }
direct e¤ect
on player j (  0)
+
 
B0j

dXi| {z }
strategic e¤ect
on player j ( > 0)
].
This decomposition shows that, in general, seless action reduces a players own net benet
17Similarly, if marginal costs are identical in the initial equilibrium C0i(X

i ) = C
0
j(X

j ), then a small
commitment by i always improves global welfare W  but has an ambiguous impact on its true objective
Si . (In the initial equilibrium, B
0
k = C
0
k (k = i; j) as both are entirely selsh.)
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(di < 0) but helps the other player (d

j > 0). Writing it more compactly yields:
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Lemma 4 The generalized impact of a small unilateral commitment di > 0 by player i
on her equilibrium true objective satises
dSi
di
=

(1  i)iB0j   (1  jij)B0iLi
 dXi
di
.
Lemma 4 thus tells us the marginal equilibrium impact of more altruistic behaviour by
player i on her true objective, taking into account its impacts on both is own contribution
e¤ort and the incentive e¤ect on js contribution.
Full commitment. We begin with one of the limiting cases: When is a full commitment
with i = 1 optimal for player i?
Proposition 3 (a) If both players true preferences are entirely altruistic i = j = 1,
then their optimal commitments i = 

j = 1 achieve rst-best e¤ort levels;
(b) If at least one player has partially selsh true preferences i < 1 or j < 1, then
optimal commitments i < 1 and 

j < 1 and both e¤orts fall short of rst-best levels.
Part (a) of the result shows that the rst-best outcome is sustainable in our model as
long as both players want to be entirely unselsh. The intuition is that if both players
care about global welfare, neither has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from a full
commitment since any such deviation, by construction, causes global welfare to fall.
Part (b) shows that this optimistic conclusion applies only where both players are en-
tirely altruistic. Whenever at least one player places greater weight on domestic welfare
in its true objective function, both playersoptimal commitments fall short of a full com-
mitment, i < 1 and 

j < 1. In such cases, given the optimal strategic preference chosen
at Date 1, player i chooses Date 2 e¤ort to maxXi 
i = i + 

i ij , with 

i i < 1.
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Think about the impact of the last steptowards a full commitment with i = 1. In
this case, the negative direct e¤ect on i is su¢ ciently negative to entirely o¤set the weighted
positive strategic e¤ect on j. The reason is that, with a full commitment, i already inter-
nalizes the externality of its choice on j (precisely to the extent it cares about her). Thus
the impact of the last step is determined solely by the two remaining e¤ects, the strategic
e¤ect on i plus the weighted direct e¤ect on j. This equals [ (1  jij)B0iLi] dXi < 0,
and is negative since i < 1 or j < 1 by assumption (and also j  1, in equilibrium).
Therefore, the last step reduces the equilibrium value of is true objective Si . The same
reasoning applies to the other player, so, in equilibrium, i < 1 and 

j < 1. It is optimal,
18The formulae in Proposition 1 (i = j = 0) and Proposition 2 (i = j = 0 and i = 1) can be
obtained as special cases of Lemma 4.
19Proposition 3 thus also rules out any values i > 1 or 

j > 1 as being sub-optimal. The reason,
loosely speaking, is that any such stronger commitment would directly hurt is own net benet by more
than it can ever strategically benet j.
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for instance, that each countriescitizens delegate decision-making regarding public good
provision to politicians whose preferences are closer to the national self-interest.
Perhaps the most striking statement of this latter result goes as follows: Suppose i is
entirely altruistic, so i = 1, while j is unselsh only to some degree with j < 1. Then
part (b) says that the optimal commitment by i satises i < 1, so a full commitment is
dominated by a weaker policy. The optimal way for i to maximize global welfare W is to
maximize a strategic objective 
i = (1   i )i + iW that is partially skewed towards
its own national welfare. In other words, a player who genuinely wants to maximize global
welfare does best by being at least somewhat selsh.
Intuitively, why can i do better than playing according to its true, entirely altruistic
preference? A small decrease in its own level of e¤ort only leads to a second-order loss in
global welfare (by the envelope theorem). But the resulting induced increase in the other
players e¤ort creates a rst-order gain in global welfare (whenever the other player is
not already choosing the rst-best e¤ort). So the reason why a full commitment is almost
never optimal is what we call reverse leakage a weaker commitment reduces free-riding
by the other player.20
Zero commitment. We now turn to the opposite limiting case. Our next result charac-
terizes when the optimal commitment for one or both players is a zero commitment.
Proposition 4 (a) If i < 1 or j < 1, and the ratio of marginal benets B0i=B
0
j is
su¢ ciently large, then player is optimal commitment i = 0;
(b) If i > 0 and j > 0 but both su¢ ciently small, then players optimal commitments
i = 

j = 0.
Part (a) of the result essentially gives a non-local version of our earlier ndings, from
Propositions 1 and 2, that a small commitment by an individual player may not raise Si ,
or indeed W . In extreme cases, it is optimal for an entirely altruistic player (when i = 1
but j < 1) to choose her e¤ort level in her own strict self-interest (i = 0).
A further implication is that a policy of zero commitment may welfare-dominate one
of full commitment. Suppose that i has a completely altruistic true preference while j is
entirely self-interested, (i; j) = (1; 0). By Lemma 3, we have that j = 0 irrespective of
is policy. But also, if B0i=B
0
j is su¢ ciently large, then equilibrium global welfare W
 is
higher with zero commitments (i; j) = (0; 0) than with (i; j) = (`; 0) for any 0  `  1
(since then dW =di  0 for all i 2 [0; `]). In this example, a global-welfare oriented
country does better by maximizing national welfare than by maximizing global welfare.
The reason for part (b) is that a player who is only slightly unselsh places too little
weight on the positive direct and strategic e¤ects that accrue to the other player for the
20A full commitment would become approximately optimal for i in limiting cases where its leakage rate
tends to zero. This happens where playersmarginal benets are approximately constant (i.e., B00k ! 0 for
k = i; j), or where the other players production technology is highly inexible (i.e., C00j !1) so its e¤ort
choice becomes almost non-strategic.
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calculus to overcome the negative impact on its own net benets. Applying this logic to
both players, optimal commitments are zero. A simple corollary is that (su¢ ciently small)
increases in one or both playerstrue levels of altruism (i and/or j), may, in equilibrium,
have no impact on the quality of public good provision since they are endogenously o¤set
by crowding-out problems. Put di¤erently, only a largedose of altruism may actually
have an e¤ect on public good provision.
Interior commitments. Given our analysis of the limiting cases, we can now provide
a characterization of playersoptimal commitments in an interior equilibrium, in which
(i ; 

j ) 2 (0; 1)2 (and thus also i > 0 and j > 0).
Proposition 5 In an interior equilibrium with (i ; 

j ) 2 (0; 1)2, player is optimal com-
mitment i satises
i =
h
i(1  LiLj)  (1  ij) (B0i=B0j)Li
i
i (1  ijLiLj) 2 (0; 1),
where the equilibrium rates of leakage
Li =
h
1 + jj(B00i =B
00
j )
i
h
1 + (C 00j =jB00j j) + jj(B00i =B00j )
i 2 (0; 1),
and player is equilibrium e¤ort satises Xi = C
0 1
i

B0i + 

i iB
0
j

> 0.
Proposition 5 implicitly describes playersoptimal interior commitments, leakage rates,
and contribution e¤orts given their respective benet and cost functions as well as their
true preferences for altruistic behaviour. In principle, a numerical solution for the six
unknowns can be obtained by making specic assumptions on the functional forms of
Bk() and Ck(). The basic informational requirement is as follows: The ratio of players
marginal benets, B0i=B
0
j , and slopes of marginal benets, B
00
i =B
00
j ; each players ratio of
the slopes of marginal cost to the slope of marginal benets, C 00k= jB00k j (with all functions
evaluated at equilibrium); and each players true preference for unselshness k (k = i; j)
The solution can be simplied under some commonly-made assumptions. Let player
ks benet function Bk() = kB(), where k > 0 is the weight placed on a global benet
function B(Xi + Xj). This has the advantage that the ratios B0i=B
0
j = B
00
i =B
00
j = i=j
become invariant to the details of playerscontributions. Also assume that marginal costs
and benets are linear, B0k(Xi + Xj) = [k   k (Xi +Xj)] and C 0k(Xk) = kXk, so that
C 00k= jB00k j = k=k is constant, too.21 Optimal commitments can then be determined more
21This latter assumption is essentially equivalent to the classic analysis of Weitzman (1974) on whether
price- or quantity-based regulation is socially preferable. It can be seen as a second-order approximation
to the unknown shapes of the underlying cost and benet functions (see also Barrett, 1994).
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easily as the solution to a system of four equations and four unknowns (i ; 

j ; Li; Lj) 2
(0; 1)4, for given underlying true preferences (i; j).
Inferring how altruistic countries are. Suppose it is observed or otherwise estimated
that player is public good contribution appears to be entirely selsh; this corresponds
to i i = 0 in our model. As the above analysis shows, it does not follow that this
players underlying true preference is completely selsh. Little or no additional e¤ort can
be consistent even with highly altruistic true preferences simply because it may arise
from i = 0 rather than i = 0. So caution is required in inferring whether or not a player
is being selsh from her observed behaviour.
More generally, we can address how playerslevels of optimal altruism compare with
true preferences:
Proposition 6 (a) For true preferences 0 < i = j < 1, optimal commitments may
satisfy i i 6= jj;
(b) For true preferences 0 < j < i, optimal commitments may satisfy jj > 

i i;
(c) If true preferences 0 < j < i, as well as B0i  B0j, and Li  Lj, optimal commitments
in an interior equilibrium satisfy (i i   jj) < (i   j).
Part (a) observes that players with identical true preferences towards altruism may
have di¤erent degrees of optimal altruism. Except in knife-edge cases, this will always
occur if they have di¤erent benet and/or cost functions. Part (b) notes that the general
relationship between true and strategic preferences is even less clear-cut. A player who
cares more about global welfare may, in equilibrium, be the player whose actions are
closer to self-interest. In short, players with identical true degrees of altruism may behave
di¤erently, and a more altruistic player may optimally behave less altruistically than
another player. Part (c) shows that, in an interior equilibrium, there is a tendency for
strategic considerations to compress any cross-player di¤erences in altruism: The di¤erence
in optimal degrees of altruism is often less than that of true degrees of altruism.
Taken together, these ndings pose obvious challenges for making cross-country infer-
ences on true degrees of altruism based on countriesobserved choices.
5 Robustness of the main results
The main results from the benchmark model are that the welfare impact of a small altruis-
tic commitment is ambiguous (Propositions 1 and 2), a full commitment is optimal only if
both players have entirely unselsh true preferences (Proposition 3), and, in some cases, a
zero commitment may be optimal despite signicantly altruistic preferences (Proposition
4). We have emphasized these limiting cases because, as explained in detail in this sec-
tion, we believe that these insights are robust to a large variety of changes to the models
specication.
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Discussion. In the above, we have, for simplicity, written each players strategic objective
as a weighted average of the form 
k = (1 k)k+kSk. But observe that our results on
the ambiguous impact of a small altruistic commitment do not rely on 
k at all. Player i,
say, raises her level of e¤ort by a small amount dXi what exactly induces this is irrelevant
for the local results of Propositions 1 and 2. Moreover, our result that a full commitment
is almost never optimal, due to reverse leakage, is based on small protable (that is,
Si -increasing) deviations away from the case where k = 1. Again, this analysis does not
depend importantly on the functional form of 
k().22 (Of course, the precise values of
(i ; 

j ) in an interior equilibrium are, in general, sensitive to the formulation of 
k(), for
instance in Proposition 5.)
Our results are also robust to di¤erent denitions of global welfare. In some ap-
plications, one might instead consider social welfare to be W = Si + Sj , where Si =
i+ij (symmetrically for j), which directly incorporates playersaltruistic preferences.
The only results potentially a¤ected are Propositions 2 and 3. It is easy to see, using
W = (1+j)i+(1+i)j , that Proposition 2 certainly goes through as above if i = j .
More generally, part (a) becomes that dW  > 0 if B0i  [(1 + i)=(1 + j)]B0j , while part
(b) remains unchanged. Moreover, Proposition 3 continues to hold, noting only that the
rst-best e¤ort levels that maximize W will, in general, di¤er from the benchmark model
(again, unless i = j).
We also assumed that a players benets Bk(Xi +Xj) depend on the unweighted sum
of e¤orts, which is an appropriate assumption for climate policy as well as a range of
other applications. But observe that the underlying intuition does not depend crucially
on the pure public good property. The two important features of our setup, in addition to
altruistic motives, are (i) that each player would, as such, like the other player to contribute
more (@Si=@Xj > 0), and (ii) the leakage problem that more e¤ort by one player crowds
out the other player (dXj =dXi < 0). Our basic insights also apply to many situations
with impure public goods, including examples we discussed in the introduction.23
In the remainder of this section, we show that our key results are also robust in several
other directions, in particular, to the generalization to n  3 players, to moderate degrees
of cross-country spillovers in costs, and to alternative representations of altruism in the true
objective function Sk, including the warm glowof Andreoni (1989, 1990). (Appendix B
provides detailed proofs.)
Generalization to n  3 players. The analysis quickly gets more complex as the
number of players increases; each individual player may have a di¤erent benet and cost
function, a di¤erent true preference for altruism towards other players, and her own leakage
rate. Nevertheless, we can exploit the fact that the model with n  3 players remains an
22For instance, we could write 
k = (1 k)kk +kS1 kk , with the weight k 2 (0; 1), or more generally

k = hk((1 k)k; kSk), where the function hk(; ) is strictly increasing in each of its arguments. Key is
that maximizing any of these alternative strategic objective boils down to maximizing Sk whenever k = 1.
23Our assumption that players hold Nash conjectures when choosing e¤ort levels at Date 2 also does not
seem critical for our results (that is, we could let i conjecture a non-zero response by j when choosing Xi).
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aggregative game (Corchón, 1994) at Date 2 when players make contribution decisions.24
The key is that an increase in is e¤ort now induces each of the n   1 other players to
cut back; in other words, player-specic leakage rates Lij  [ R0j(Xi)] are positive. But
the overall leakage rate Li 
P
j 6=i Lij 2 (0; 1) remains less than 100% and so global
contributions rise (corresponding to Lemma 2).25
Consider a small commitment by player 1 (beginning in a completely selsh world with
fkgnk=1 = 0), and, to illustrate, suppose that n = 3. The increase in 1s e¤ort directly
raises the net benets of 2 and 3. It also induces 2 to contribute less, which hurts 1
but now also hurts 3. Similarly, reduced e¤ort by 2 hurts 1 and 3. So 1 is hurt twice
due to leakage, and it now induces positive and negative e¤ects on each of the other two
players which it cares about depending on its true preference for altruism. In general,
the number of e¤ects to take into account is of order n2.
The welfare impact of a small commitment is, as before, ambiguous. In particular,
we can show that our earlier conditions from Proposition 1 generalize cleanly: dSi > 0
holds whenever i has a marginal benet that is (weakly) below average B0i  B
0
 i, its true
preference exceeds the leakage rate i > Li, and the covariance between the n   1 other
playersmarginal benets and their leakage rates is non-negative cov(B0j ; Lij)  0.26 The
latter condition ensures that those players that cut e¤ort back more strongly are also those
which benet more strongly from is altruism. (Signing cov(B0j ; Lij) is an empirical issue
which may have di¤erent answers for di¤erent public good problems and di¤erent players
therein.) Conversely, if B0i=B
0
 i is su¢ ciently large and cov(B0j ; Lij)  0, then dSi < 0.
The conditions for dW  7 0 follow similarly, and generalize Proposition 2.
Our reverse leakage intuition also applies with n  3 players. Say player 1 cares
about global welfare and suppose it engages in a full commitment. Since player-specic
leakage rates are positive, a small decrease in its e¤ort which comes at a second-order
loss to global welfare induces each of the n 1 other players to increase e¤ort. As long as
at least one of the other players was doing too little from a global-welfare viewpoint, the
reverse-leakage e¤ect leads to at least one rst-order gain. In a sense, a larger number of
players makes altruistic behaviour more di¢ cult to justify a single bad appleis enough
to make all playersoptimal commitments fall short of rst-best.
Using analogous arguments to those in the benchmark analysis, a zero commitment is
optimal for a player who derives su¢ ciently low marginal benets or with a su¢ ciently
low (yet non-zero) true degree of altruism.
Cross-country cost spillovers. It is frequently argued, notably in the context of the
24 In an aggregative game, each players payo¤ depends only on her own action and a summary statistic
of all other playersactions (in our case, the unweighted sum of otherse¤orts).
25We note that many of our basic insights would also apply in settings in which some player-specic
leakage rates are zero (or even negative), so long as the overall leakage rate remains su¢ ciently high.
26Formally, we dene this covariance based the following:
1
(n  1)
P
j 6=iB
0
j(Li   Lij) =

1
(n  1)
P
j 6=iB
0
j

1
(n  1)
P
j 6=i(Li   Lij)

  cov(B0j ; Lij):
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development of renewable energy sources such as solar and wind, that more CO2 abatement
e¤ort by one country creates knock-on benets for other countries in that it leads to a
reduction in their (marginal) abatement costs, for instance, due to learning-curve e¤ects
and technology spillovers.
We can represent such a scenario in the model by considering a more general cost
function Ci(Xi; Xj) which depends on both countriese¤ort levels. We assume that B00i <
@2Ci=@Xi@Xj < 0 and @Ci=@Xj < 0  @2Ci=@X2j ; more investment by country j reduces
country is total cost (at a decreasing rate), and also reduces its marginal cost (but not
too strongly, @2Ci=@Xi@Xj > B00i ). These conditions are su¢ cient to ensure the model
remains well-behaved, and leakage rates remain strictly positive as is consistent with the
existing empirical evidence for climate policy.27
Cost spillovers are a two-edged sword. Consider the impact of a small altruistic com-
mitment by i. This increases js national welfare, appropriately weighted, by i(B0j  
@Cj=@Xi)dX

i > 0, which, loosely speaking, is more positive than before. However, the
resulting carbon leakage a¤ects is own national welfare by  [(B0i  @Ci=@Xj)Li]dXi < 0,
which is more negative than before. Thus, cost spillovers make it easier to help the other
player, but also exacerbate the leakage problem for the altruistic player. The welfare impact
of a small commitment thus remains ambiguous in general even if i cares about global
welfare (with i = 1).
Our reverse-leakage argument also applies, again in a sense more strongly than in the
benchmark model. A small reduction in is commitment away from the full-commitment
level still induces j to increase e¤ort; this is now doubly benecial in that it increases is
benets but now also reduces her costs.
In some cases, again, a zero commitment is optimal. Essentially, this happens when
the net benet to i of additional e¤ort by j, (B0i   @Ci=@Xj), is su¢ ciently larger than
the net benet to j of additional e¤ort by i, (B0j @Cj=@Xi). This generalizes the relative
marginal benets condition from Proposition 4(a); a zero commitment is more likely for a
player who enjoys relatively strong cost spillovers from otherse¤orts. It is clear that the
conditions from Proposition 4(b) apply here too.
Other altruistic objective functions. Playerstrue objective functions in our bench-
mark model represent pure altruism: A player directly cares about another players
welfare. Suppose more generally that is true objective function Si = (1   ei)i + ei	i,
where 	i(Xi; Xj). Dene i  (	i   i) so that we can write Si = i + eii.28 Policy
decisions are delegated, say, by way of a strategic objective 
i = (1  ei)i + eiSi, where
the strategic preference ei 2 [0; 1].
27 If cost spillovers are so strong that they turn leakage rates negative, this would alter the fundamental
nature of the public-good game. Then the externality between countries would turn positive at the margin,
and a full commitment would generally become optimal (or an even stronger commitment insofar as a
country is able to commit to placing less than full weight on its own national welfare). See also our
concluding discussion in Section 7.
28 In the benchmark model, 	k = W (for k = i; j) and so i = j (and vice versa).
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Various alternative objectives can be represented this way, including forms of impure
altruism. For example, it has been argued that contributing to a public good yields a warm
glow (Andreoni 1989, 1990); such objectives are essentially equivalent to i = gi(Xi),
so the player derives direct utility-benets from her e¤ort (with g0i() > 0 and g00i ()  0).
It has also been suggested to us that some countries are willing to ignore some of the
CO2 abatement costs they incur in unilateral climate action, that is, i = Ci(Xi) andei 2 [0; 1] is the true preference for cost understatement. Conversely, some countries may
overestimate the benets of their actions, for example, by using too high a discount
factor in policy analysis.
Under of any of these objectives, a stronger commitment by a player increases her own
contribution but raises global contributions by less (Lemmas 1 and 2). For other objectives,
these conclusions hold under mild assumptions; su¢ cient conditions are @i=@Xi > 0 and
@i=@Xj  0 as well as [(B00i   C 00i ) + @2i=@X2i ] < 0 and @2i=@Xi@Xj  0.
Consider the impact of a small commitment dXi =dei > 0, starting from ei = ej = 0.
By similar arguments as in the benchmark model, this increases is true objective bybi (@i=@Xi) (dXi =dei) > 0. However, crowding-out a¤ects is true objective accord-
ing to  f[B0i + ei (@i=@Xj)]Lig(dXi =dei) < 0. The sign of the overall welfare impact
(dSi =dei)ei=ej=0 is thus ambiguous in general, even if ei = 1. It is also not di¢ cult to
conrm that the impact of a small commitment dei > 0 on equilibrium global welfare W 
is exactly as in Proposition 2 above.
Our reverse-leakage argument applies since i always wants j to increase its e¤ort (that
is, @Si=@Xj > 0). A small reduction away from a full commitment (with ei = 1) leads
to a rst-order increase in Si , such that the optimal commitment ei < 1. This is always
the case for any of the impureforms of altruism discussed above, including the warm
glow(even if j is already choosing its e¤ort to maximize global welfare).29
Finally, under some conditions on bi and i(), a zero commitment becomes optimal;
it turns out that a simple su¢ cient condition for ei = 0 is @i=@Xi  B0i, that is, a higher
national contribution raises benets no less than the altruistic part of is objective.
6 Further properties of the model
To close our analysis, we highlight two other features of the benchmark model: First, the
impact of altruistic behaviour on leakage at Date 2, and, second, the strategic properties
of playerscommitments at Date 1 of the game.
The impact of altruism on leakage. It may seem natural to conjecture that altruistic
behaviour tends to mitigate free-riding and reduce leakage. It turns out that, under some
circumstances, this intuition is quite misleading:
29Compared to the benchmark model, the disadvantage of such other objective functions is that the
global-welfare preference (social cost of carbon) is no longer a natural special case.
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Proposition 7 (a) Suppose that B000j  0 and C 000j  0. Player is leakage rate is higher
when player j also has an unselsh commitment than when player j acts entirely selshly,
Lijj>0 > Lijj=0.
(b) Suppose that B00i =B
00
j and B
00
j =C
00
j are both constant. Player is leakage rate increases
in player js commitment, (dLi=dj)j0 > 0.
To understand the result, recall js rst-order condition for its e¤ort choice, @
j=@Xj =
(@j=@Xj) + jj (@i=@Xj) = 0. The overall rate of leakage can hence be thought of in
two parts: Firstly, a selsh component @j=@Xj , and, secondly, an altruistic component
@i=@Xj (which, in equilibrium, receives weight jj). The key point is that the altruistic
component has a leakage rate of 100%. To see why, observe that holding @i=@Xj =
B0i(Xi +Xj) xed (along js reaction function) in response to a small increase in is e¤ort
dXi > 0 requires a decrease in js e¤ort dXj =  dXi < 0 that is exactly o¤setting. Greater
weight on the altruistic part therefore certainly tends to increase the overall leakage rate
as long as the selsh part does not decline as a result. The conditions given in Proposition
7 are, respectively, (a) su¢ cient for the selsh part to not decline, and (b) necessary and
su¢ cient for it to stay constant.30
Although global welfare may (but need not) be higher when players pursue altruistic
objectives, the associated leakage rates can also be higher than with self-interested be-
haviour. Put di¤erently, altruism can worsen the free-riding problem at the margin. From
an empirical point of view, this suggests a surprising possibility: Rates of carbon leakage
associated with unilateral climate action may be high precisely because countries are
behaving altruistically. The more general point is that leakage rates though a useful and
important statistic are not always a reliable welfare indicator.
Policy commitments: Strategic substitutes or complements? Finally, we explore
the strategic properties of the game at Date 1 where players choose their respective pol-
icy commitments. For this analysis, it will be useful to dene a leakage-commitment
elasticity:
ij 
dLi=Li
dj=j
.
This measures the elasticity of player is leakage rate with respect to a stronger com-
mitment by player j. For example, under the conditions of Proposition 7(b), we found
(dLi=dj)j0 > 0, implying that, in such cases, the leakage-commitment elasticity ij > 0
(in an interior equilibrium). Using this metric, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 8 Consider an interior equilibrium with (i ; 

j ) 2 (0; 1)2.
(a) Suppose that B0i=B
0
j is constant. Player is optimal commitment varies with player js
30We note that the results of Proposition 7 would also apply if players altruistic commitments were
not chosen optimally; they speak generally to the impact of altruism on leakage, not necessarily that of
optimal altruism on leakage.
20
commitment according to
sign

di
dj

= sign

1
ij
 

1  jij
jij

where ij  [(dLi=Li)=(dj=j)]k=k is the (equilibrium) leakage-commitment elasticity.
(b) Suppose that B0i=B
0
j, B
00
j =C
00
j and B
00
i =B
00
j are all constant. Then the leakage-commitment
elasticity ij 2 (0; 1), and so di =dj > 0 if jij  12 while di =dj < 0 if jij is
su¢ ciently small.
In general, therefore, it is ambiguous whether playerspolicy commitments are strategic
substitutes or strategic complements. If the leakage-commitment elasticity ij > 0 and
the joint-altruism term jij is su¢ ciently small, then we have strategic substitutes
(di =dj < 0). By contrast, if ij  0 or if jij is su¢ ciently large, then we have
strategic complements (di =dj > 0). Of course, the results from Proposition 7 suggests
that, in many cases, ij > 0; if so, the level of 

jij becomes the main determinant of a
commitments strategic properties.31
Proposition 8 strikes us as interesting for several reasons. First, it has a similar avour
to an intuition found in other public good models: Commitments are strategic complements
if they are already high, but strategic substitutes when they are low (see, e.g., the
tipping-point analysis of Heal and Kunreuther, 2010). Second, the strategic properties of
the game in commitment space (Date 1) may thus di¤er from those of the e¤ort game
(Date 2) which is always characterized by strategic substitutes (Lemma 1).32
Illustrative example. We present a simplied example to illustrate our results from this
section, and to link them to our earlier ndings. Suppose that players are symmetric with
identical benet and cost functions, but asymmetric in that their true levels of altruism
di¤er, where i = 1 but j < 1. In particular, assume B0k(Xi +Xj) =  Xi Xj , so that
B0i=B
0
j = B
00
i =B
00
j = 1 is constant, and that C
00
k= jB00k j = 1 is constant (for k = i; j).
Without any further calculations, we know that i > 0 by Proposition 1(a) but also
that i < 1 and 

j < 1 by Proposition 3(b); here, we consider two scenarios:
31Cases with ij  0 seem relatively unusual but could occur where C000j is positive and large near
equilibrium, in other words, where e¤ort costs are highly convex.
32We have unfortunately not been able to derive a full set of results on the welfare impact of a sequential
move order at Date 1. That is, what happens if one player is a leader in choosing her strategic prefer-
ence? We conjecture that, in general, it is ambiguous if sequential commitment makes a di¤erence and
if such di¤erence raises or reduces overall welfare. A partial analysis goes as follows: Whenever policy
commitments are strategic complements (see Proposition 8), a stronger commitment by the rst-mover
induces the follower to also raise her e¤ort and so global contributions at Date 2 rise. This, however,
does not characterize optimal sequential commitments. A players optimal commitment in our benchmark
model may be zero (Proposition 4); in such cases, a change to sequential moves may make no di¤erence
insofar as a player remains stuck in a corner (at j = 0). Moreover, while global contributions may
rise, the preceding analysis highlights that this need not yield a welfare improvement. Finally, we have not
characterized the conditions under which a player would, in fact, want to become a rst-mover in the rst
place. Nonetheless, based on these arguments, we arrive at the conjecture described above.
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First, suppose, that j is su¢ ciently small, in particular j & 613 that 

j & 0. Using
Lemma 4, is optimal commitment then solves the rst-order condition dSi =di ' (1  
i)   Li(j) = 0 =) i '

1  Li(j )
 2 (0; 1), where the equilibrium leakage rate
Li(

j ) = (1 +

jj)=
 
2 + jj

. It is then immediate that di =dj '  (dLi=dj)j=j <
0. Put di¤erently, in this example, Proposition 7(b) and the strategic substitutes part of
Proposition 8(b) are two sides of the same coin: i regards js commitment as a strategic
substitute because a stronger commitment by j drives up the leakage rate associated with
is own policy.33 In summary, (i; j) = (1; 613) =) (i ; j ) = (12 ; 0), which also conrms
our earlier argument, based on Proposition 4, that large degrees of true altruism may only
lead to much lower degrees of optimal/observed altruism.
Second, and by contrast, assume that j is su¢ ciently large such that jj  12 .34
Then we have that di =dj > 0 by the other part of Proposition 7(b), and so commitments
become strategic complements. In such cases, loosely speaking, the additional commitment
by j is su¢ ciently valuable, in that it raises the marginal return on is own commitment,
to o¤set the adverse impact of the higher leakage rate.
7 Concluding remarks
We have studied the welfare impact of altruism in a model of public good provision,
and introduced a notion of optimal altruism. Altruistically-minded yet rational
players take into account the incentive e¤ects of their actions on other players. Due to
crowding-out e¤ects, optimal altruistic commitments are almost always weaker than the
true willingness to pursue unselsh action and, in some cases, much weaker. Following
through on altruistic preferences tends to be more di¢ cult for a player who derives an
above-average marginal benet from contributions and incurs a high leakage rate. We
have argued that our main results which mostly emphasize limiting cases are robust
to a variety of natural changes in model specication, including di¤erent types of public
good problems and di¤erent representations of purely and impurely altruistic preferences.
We can relate our ndings to the unilateral climate-policy initiatives discussed in the
introduction. By incorporating countriessocial preferences we can, in principle, explain
any outcome between the standard self-interested equilibrium and rst-best. So the uni-
lateral actions observed at the local, national, and regional levels might indeed be driven
by altruistic preferences.
Our equilibrium analysis yields some sharper conclusions. Under our assumptions,
it is not optimal for an individual country or any subset of countries to unilaterally
commit to taking the full social cost of carbon into account in domestic policy. A
33To check when indeed j & 0, use js rst-order condition to obtain dSj =dj = (1   j)j   (1  
ij)Lj = 0 =) (1   j ) =
 
 1j   i

Lj . It follows that j & 0 whenever ( 1j   i )Lj . 1 () j &
(L 1j +

i )
 1. Now using i ' (1 Li) as well as Lj = (1+i )= (2 + i ) ' (2 Li)=(3 Li), this can also
be written as j & 0 whenever j &

(3 Li)
(2 Li) + (1  Li)
 1
' 6
13
since then Li = (1+jj)=(2+

jj) & 12 .
34By Proposition 3(a), we have that j ! 1 as j ! 1, so also jj ! 1. Then, by continuity, we also
have that jj  12 for j su¢ ciently large.
22
weaker commitment is better because of reverse-leakage: Others are induced to do more,
and this is socially (more) valuable. By contrast, using the SCC only in a selected range
of projects may seem broadly consistent with our results.
We can also provide a rationale for a puzzle: Little or no action beyond business-as-
usual by apparently altruistically-minded players. In our model, social preferences are
necessary but not su¢ cient for countries to deviate from their self-interested levels of
contribution. Even large degrees of altruism (or increases in altruism) can, in equilibrium,
be negated by leakage, so optimal commitments are zero. We have highlighted that it may
be di¢ cult to infer a players true preferences from its observed public good contribution.
Our model provides what seems a natural way of thinking about the role that altruism
can play in public good problems characterized by the absence of central mechanism
designer. The basic message from our analysis is somewhat pessimistic: The tension
between altruism and crowding-out e¤ects makes it more di¢ cult to improve public good
provision. What, then, could lead to more favourable outcomes?
First, our model has examined the impact of altruism in a non-cooperative setting. In
practice, unilateral climate action, for example, by the EU and others has taken place in
the shadowof evolving cooperative talks between countries, and there may be strategic
interaction between them. One view is that leadership in form of unilateral initiatives
signals a willingness to cooperate and thus facilitates agreement; some recent papers,
however, have noted that unilateral policy may, in fact, undermine future negotiations
(Beccherle and Tirole, 2011; Harstad, 2012).
Second, and perhaps most obviously, leakage rates may be zero or even negative in
some situations, i.e., public good contributions are strategic complements. Then players
may nd it optimal to follow through on their altruistic preferences and perhaps try to
nd ways to commit to doing even more. However, as noted above, negative leakage is not
a particularly common feature of public good models, and we are not aware of any such
empirical evidence for our application to climate policy.
Third, and related, the relevant contracting space may be richer. Players might be able
to make their commitments conditional on what other players are doing. For example,
the EU maintains a commitment to augment its 2020 carbon-emissions reduction from
20% to 30% if less-developed countries agree to certain abatement targets although this
commitment has, to date, not actually been activated.35 In terms of our model, this can
be interpreted as an attempt to change the game: is conditional commitment turns js
leakage rate negative, at least over some range, and thus encourages it to do more. (But
note that is own leakage rate remains positive.) Again, the existing literature draws mixed
conclusions. While conditional commitment is superior to unconditional commitment in
some situations (Hoel 1991), matching contributions are ine¤ective in others (Boadway,
Song and Tremblay 2007) and may actually worsen public good provision if commitments
35Perhaps the most well-known example of such conditional commitments comes from charitable giving,
where an initial large donor promises to match contributions by subsequent donors according to some
agreed rule. It is interesting how such matching contributions play very di¤erent roles across di¤erent
kinds of public good problems.
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are only made by a subset of players (Buchholz, Cornes and Rübbelke 2012).36
The existing public goods literature on the role of conditional commitments and the
evolution of policy negotiations over time has, however, paid little attention to the role of
altruistic preferences. Combining the optimal-altruism approach presented in this paper
di¤erent players are altruistic to di¤erent degrees and recognize the incentive e¤ects of their
actions with such richer contracting environments may be an interesting and important
topic for future research.
References
Andreoni, James (1989). Giving With Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and
Ricardian Equivalence. Journal of Political Economy 97, 14471458.
Andreoni, James (1990). Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of
Warm-Glow Giving. Economic Journal 100, 464477.
Babiker, Mustafa H. (2005). Climate Change Policy, Market Structure and Carbon Leak-
age. Journal of International Economics 65, 421445.
Barrett, Scott (1994). Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements. Oxford
Economic Papers 46, 878894.
Barrett, Scott (2005). The Theory of International Environmental Agreements. In: Karl-
Göran Mäler and Je¤rey R. Vincent (eds.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, Vol-
ume 3, Elsevier.
Beccherle, Julien and Jean Tirole (2011). Regional Initiatives and the Cost of Delaying
Binding Climate Change Agreements. Journal of Public Economics 95, 13391348.
Becker, Gary S. (1974). A Theory of Social Interactions. Journal of Political Economy 82,
10631094.
Bergstrom, Theodore C. (1989). A Fresh Look at the Rotten Kid Theorem and Other
Household Mysteries. Journal of Political Economy 97, 11381159.
Boadway, Robin, Zhen Song and Jean-Franc¾ois Tremblay (2007). Commitment and Match-
ing Contributions to Public Goods. Journal of Public Economics 91, 16641683.
Bolton, Gary E. and Axel Ockenfels (2000). ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and
Competition. American Economic Review 90, 166193.
36Better outcomes can at least in some situations also be achieved by di¤erent forms of side con-
tracting, for example, if players can make side payments contingent on other playersactions (Jackson
and Wilkie 2005) or if di¤erent policy domains such as environmental policy and trade policy can be
linked (Harstad 2010).
24
Buchholz, Wolfgang, Richard Cornes and Dirk Rübbelke (2012). Potentially Harmful In-
ternational Cooperation on Global Public Good Provision. Working Paper at University
of Regensburg, July.
Copeland, Brian R. and M. Scott Taylor (2005). Free Trade and Global Warming: A
Trade Theory View of the Kyoto Protocol. Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 49, 205234.
Corchón, Luis C. (1994). Comparative Statics for Aggregative Games: The Strong Con-
cavity Case. Mathematical Social Sciences 28, 151165.
DECC (2009). Climate Change Act 2008: Impact Assessment. Department of Energy and
Climate Change (United Kingdom), March.
Edgeworth, Francis Y. (1881). Mathematical Physics: An Essay on the Application of
Mathematics to the Moral Sciences. Kegan Paul.
Fehr, Ernst and Klaus M. Schmidt (1999). A Theory Of Fairness, Competition, and Co-
operation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 817868.
Greenstone, Michael, Elizabeth Kopits and Ann Wolverton (2013). Developing the Social
Cost of Carbon for U.S. Regulatory Analysis: A Methodology and Interpretation. Review
of Environmental Economics and Policy 7, 2346.
Harstad, Bård (2010). Do Side Payments Help? Collective Decisions and Strategic Dele-
gation. Journal of the European Economic Association 6, 468477.
Harstad, Bård (2012). The Dynamics of Climate Agreements. Working Paper at North-
western University, August.
Heal, Geo¤rey and Howard Kunreuther (2010). Social Reinforcement: Cascades, Entrap-
ment, and Tipping. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2, 8699.
Hoel, Michael (1991). Global Environmental Problems: The E¤ects of Unilateral Actions
Taken by One Country. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 20, 5570.
IPCC (2007). Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Chapter 11: Mitigation from a Cross-
Sectoral Perspective. Cambridge University Press.
Jackson, Matthew O. and Simon Wilkie (2005). Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side
Payments Among Players. Review of Economic Studies 72, 543566.
Kosfeld, Michael, Akira Okada and Arno Riedl (2009). Institution Formation in Public
Goods Games. American Economic Review 99, 13351355.
Lange, Andreas and Carsten Vogt (2003). Cooperation in International Environmental
Negotiations Due to a Preference for Equity. Journal of Public Economics 87, 20492067.
25
Levrahi, David and Leonard J. Mirman (1980). The Great Fish War: An Example Using
a Dynamic Cournot-Nash Solution. RAND Journal of Economics 11, 322334.
Olson, Mancur and Richard Zeckhauser (1966). An Economic Theory of Alliances. Review
of Economics and Statistics 48, 266279.
Rabin, Matthew (1993). Incorporating Fairness Into Game Theory and Economics. Amer-
ican Economic Review 83, 12811302.
Ritz, Robert A. (2009). Carbon Leakage under Incomplete Environmental Regulation: An
Industry-Level Approach. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, November.
Roelfsema, Hein (2007). Strategic Delegation of Environmental Policy Making. Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 53, 270275.
Schelling, Thomas C. (1960). The Strategy of Conict. Harvard University Press.
Sobel, Joel (2005). Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity. Journal of Economic Lit-
erature 43, 392436.
Stavins, Robert N. (2011). The Problem of the Commons: Still Unsettled after 100 Years.
American Economic Review 101, 81108.
Stern, Nicholas (2008). The Economics of Climate Change. American Economic Review
98, 137.
Sunstein, Cass R. (2007). Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols. Harvard
Environmental Law Review 31, 165.
Tol, Richard S. J. (2012). A Cost-Benet Analysis of the EU 20/20/2020 Package. Energy
Policy 49, 288295.
Watkiss, Paul and Chris Hope (2011). Using the Social Cost of Carbon in Regulatory
Deliberations. WIREs Climate Change 2:6, 886901.
Weitzman, Martin L. (1974). Prices vs Quantities. Review of Economic Studies 41, 477
491.
26
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2. Observe that for player i, say, dXi =di = @X

i =@i+R
0
i(X

j )[dX

j =di]
and dXj =di = R
0
j(X

i )[dX

i =di], so that
dXi
di
=
@Xi =@ih
1 R0i(Xj )R0j(Xi )
i = @Xi =@i
(1  LiLj) .
The denominator of this expression is positive by Lemma 1. Di¤erentiating is rst-order
condition from (3) yields that the numerator @Xi =@i = iB
0
j=( B00i +C 00i  iiB00j ), from
which the result is immediate (since B0k > 0 > B
00
k and C
00
k > 0, k = i; j).
Proof of Lemma 3. Let Xsi denote the level of e¤ort that solves is rst-order condition
@i=@Xi = 0 at Date 2. Committing at Date 1 to deviate from this a¤ects is equilibrium
payo¤ according to
di
dXi
=
@i
@Xi
+
@i
@Xj
R0j .
The rst term, @i =@Xi, is non-positive: By denition, it equals zero at X
s
i , and it is
negative by the concavity of the payo¤ function i for any Xi > Xsi . The second term,
(@i =@Xj)R
0
j , is negative since @

i =@Xj = B
0
i > 0 and R
0
j   Li < 0 by Lemma 1. So
a player k cannot do any better than choosing to her e¤ort to maxXk k, as claimed.
Proof of Proposition 3. Before turning to the two parts of the proposition, we rst
establish that k > 1 cannot be optimal. To see this, note using the formula from Lemma
4 that
dSi
di
 (1  i)iB0j   (1  i)B0iLi dXidi (5)
since jj  1 by our assumption. It follows that (dSi =di)ji>1 < 0 for any i 2 [0; 1]
such that the optimal commitment must satisfy i  1 (and analogously for j).
For part (a), setting i = j = 1 in the formula from Lemma 4 shows that
dSi
di

i=j=1
=
dW 
di
=
 
(1  i)B0j   (1  j)B0iLi
 dXi
di

i=j=1
.
So if j is playing j = 1, then (dW =di)jj=1 = [(1   i)B0j ] (dXi =di)  0 for all
i 2 [0; 1]. So is best response is to also play bi(1) = 1, and so optimal commitments
i = 

j = 1.
For part (b), we proceed in two steps, looking rst at the case where i < 1 and then at
the case where i = 1. Suppose that i < 1; then we have using (5) that
dSi
di

i=1
   (1  i)B0iLi dXidi ,
and so (dSi =di)ji=1 < 0 whenever i < 1. We conclude that if i < 1, then i < 1.
Suppose now that i = 1 but that j < 1. From our previous argument, we know that
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j < 1, so also 

jj < 1. Again using the formula from Lemma 4, we thus have
dSi
di
< (1  i)B0j
dXi
di
,
and so (dSi =di)ji=1 < 0, again implying that i < 1. These arguments establish that
if either i < 1 or j < 1, then i < 1 and 

j < 1.
Proof of Proposition 4. For part (a), use the formula from Lemma 4 to obtain
dSi
di
= B0j
 
(1  i)i   (1  jij)B
0
i
B0j
Li
!
dXi
di
.
If i < 1 or j < 1, so also jj < 1 by Proposition 3(b), then dSi =di < 0 for all
i 2 [0;  1i ] and j 2 [0;  1j ] if B0i=B0j is su¢ ciently large, so that the optimal commitment
i = 0.
For part (b), observe similarly that dSi =di < 0 for all i 2 [0;  1i ] and j 2 [0;  1j ] if i
is su¢ ciently small. So if i and j are both su¢ ciently small, then optimal commitments
i = 

j = 0 as claimed.
Proof of Proposition 5. In an interior equilibrium, is best response bi(j) satises the
rst-order condition dSi =di = 0. Using the formula from Lemma 4, we thus have
bii = i   (1  jij)B0i
B0j
Li.
Now using this together with the analogous expression for js best response bj(i) yields
that is optimal commitment i  bi(bj) solves
i i = i  
"
(1  ij) B
0
i
B0j
Li + i(1  i ij)LiLj
#
,
which can be arranged to give
i =
h
i(1  LiLj)  (1  ij) (B0i=B0j)Li
i
i (1  ijLiLj)
as claimed. The expression for the rate of leakage Li is obtained from Lemma 1 and some
rearranging of (4). The expression for country is e¤ort Xi > 0 is obtained by rewriting
its rst-order condition from (3) and noting that the inverse C 0 1i () is well-dened under
the maintained assumptions C 0i() > 0, C 00i () > 0, and Ci(0) = C 0i(0) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 6. For part (a), note that this requires an interior equilibrium
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(i ; 

j ) 2 (0; 1)2, and so rewrite the expression for i from Proposition 5 as
i i = i  
(1  ij)
(1  ijLiLj)
 
iLj +
B0i
B0j
!
Li.
Thus the di¤erence in the two playersdegrees of altruism satises
 
i

i   jj

= (i   j)  (1  ij)
(1  ijLiLj)
"
(i   j)LiLj +
 
B0i
B0j
Li  
B0j
B0i
Lj
!#
. (6)
Setting 0 < i = j < 1, it is clear that optimal commitments may satisfy i i 6= jj , as
claimed; in particular, this occurs whenever Li=Lj 6= (B0i=B0j)2. For part (b), since j < 1,
it follows that i = 0 by Proposition 4(a) for su¢ ciently large B0i=B
0
j , and so 

i i = 0.
Using the result from Lemma 4, dSj =dj  0 for su¢ ciently small values of j 2 [0; 1] if
B0i=B
0
j is su¢ ciently large, so 

j > 0, and so 

jj > 0. But since 0 < j < i, optimal
commitments in this example satisfy jj > 

i i, as claimed.
For part (c), with 0 < j < i, direct inspection of (6) shows that optimal commitments
in an interior equilibrium satisfy (i i   jj) < (i   j) if B0i  B0j and Li  Lj , as
claimed.
Proof of Proposition 7. For part (a), it follows from Proposition 4(b) that j > 0 must
imply that j > 0, and so also jj > 0. By contrast, 

j = 0 also means that 

jj = 0.
By (4) and Lemma 1, the leakage rate when j = 0 equals
Lijj=0 =
1
1 +
h
C 00j =( B00j )
i
j=0
 ,
while leakage with j > 0 is given by
Lijj>0 =

1 + jj
h
B00i =B
00
j
i
j>0


1 +
h
C 00j =( B00j )
i
j>0
+ jj
h
B00i =B
00
j
i
j>0
 .
So
h
C 00j =( B00j )
i
j>0

h
C 00j =( B00j )
i
j=0
is a su¢ cient condition for Lijj>0 > Lijj=0.
Furthermore, note that
d
dj
"
C 00j
 B00j
#
=
1
( B00j )2

C 000j
dXj
dj
( B00j )  ( B000j )(1  Lj)
dXj
dj
C 00j

and so (since dXj =dj > 0 by Lemma 2) we have that
sign
 
d
dj
"
C 00j
 B00j
#!
= sign
 
C 000j ( B00j ) +B000j (1  Lj)C 00j

,
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where the right-hand side is certainly non-positive if B000j  0 and C 000j  0 (since Lj 2 (0; 1)
by Lemma 1), from which the claim follows. For part (b), di¤erentiation of the leakage
rate Li shows that it is increasing in j if B00i =B
00
j and B
00
j =C
00
j are both constant, as claimed.
Proof of Proposition 8. For part (a), in an interior equilibrium (which implies that
k > 0 for k = i; j), is strategic choice of preference bi(j) is determined by its rst-order
condition dSi =di = 0 at Date 1. Using the formula from Lemma 4, this condition can be
written as bii = i   (1  jij)B0i
B0j
Li.
Di¤erentiating, and using the assumption that B0i=B
0
j is constant, shows that the slope of
is best response curve satises
dbi
dj
i =
B0i
B0j

ijLi   (1  jij)dLi
dj

.
At an interior equilibrium with (i ; 

j ) 2 (0; 1)2, this expression can be rearranged as
di
dj
i
Li
=
B0i
B0j

ij   (1  jij)
j
ij

where the leakage-commitment elasticity ij  [(dLi=Li)=(dj=j)]k=k is evaluated at
equilibrium, and from which the result follows immediately. For part (b), using (4) and
Lemma 1, we can write the leakage-commitment elasticity i  (dLi=Li)=(dj=j) as
ij =
j

1 + jj
B00i
B00j
+
C00j
 B00j


1 + jj
B00i
B00j
 d
dj
264 1 + jj B
00
i
B00j
1 + jj
B00i
B00j
+
C00j
 B00j
375 .
Di¤erentiating, using the assumption that B00i =B
00
j and B
00
j =C
00
j are both constant, and then
simplifying yields:
ij =
j

1 + jj
B00i
B00j
+
C00j
 B00j


1 + jj
B00i
B00j

264j B
00
i
B00j
h
1 + jj
B00i
B00j
+
C00j
 B00j
i
  j B
00
i
B00j
h
1 + jj
B00i
B00j
i
h
1 + jj
B00i
B00j
+
C00j
 B00j
i2
375
=
jj
B00i
B00j
1 + jj
B00i
B00j

h
C00j
 B00j
i
h
1 + jj
B00i
B00j
+
C00j
 B00j
i
Since jj > 0 in an interior equilibrium, we have that the equilibrium value of the
elasticity ij 2 (0; 1). Observe that the condition from part (a) on the sign of di =dj
still applies as it was derived from weaker assumptions. Since now ij 2 (0; 1), it follows
by inspection that di =dj > 0 if 

jij  12 , as claimed. Similarly, since ij > 0, it is
easy to see that di =dj < 0 if 

jij is su¢ ciently small.
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Appendix B: Robustness
Generalization to n  3 players
Preliminaries. Consider the same setup as in the benchmark model but with n  3
players. Let N = f1; 2; :::; ng denote the set of players, and let i be a member of this
set. Player is national welfare i = Bi(X)   Ci(Xi), where global contributions X P
k2N Xk, while global welfareW =
P
k2N k, and its true objective Si = (1 i)i+iW
and strategic objective 
i = (1   i)i + iSi, where i 2 [0; 1] and i 2 [0;  1i ]. The
interaction between players at Date 2, when each chooses e¤ort to maximize her strategic
objective 
k is an aggregative game(Corchón, 1994): each players objective depends
only on its own e¤ort Xk and the (unweighted) sum of all playerse¤orts X.
Player is rst-order condition for e¤ort at Date 2 can be written as
0 =
@
i
@Xi
=

B0i(X)  C 0i(Xi) + ii
X
j2NnfigB
0
j(X)

 Ti(Xi; X; i). (7)
The function Ti(Xi; X; i) is strictly decreasing in both Xi and X (since C 00k () > 0 and
B00k() < 0, respectively for all k). Moreover, whenever i > 0, the function Ti(Xi; X; i)
is strictly increasing in the strategic preference i. The model thus satises Assumptions
1, 2, and 4 of Corchón (1994). Applying Proposition 4 of Corchón (1994) shows that an
increase in i leads to (a) a strict increase in X, (b) a strict increase in Xi , and (c) a
strict decrease in Xj for all j 6= i.
We can recast these results in terms of our model and terminology as
dX
di
=
dXi
di
+
X
j 6=iR
0
j(Xi)
dXi
di
=

1 
X
j 6=i Lij
 dXi
di
= (1  Li) dX

i
di
> 0,
where R0j(Xi) is the slope of js reaction function with respect to is e¤ort choice. An
increase in is commitment i leads to an increase in its equilibrium e¤ort Xi (as in
Lemma 2 of our benchmark model). This induces each of the n 1 other players to reduce
their e¤orts, that is, player-specic leakage rates Lij  [ R0j(Xi)] > 0. However, the
overall leakage rate Li 
P
j 6=i Lij 2 (0; 1) such that global e¤ort rises (as in Lemma 1).
Results. We rst derive a generalized version of Lemma 4 from the benchmark model in
several steps. With n  3 players, the equilibrium impact of a stronger commitment by i
on her true objective can be written as
dSi
di
=

dSi
dXi
 
X
j2Nnfig

dSi
dXj
Lij

dXi
di
, (8)
and we next derive explicit expressions for its individual components.
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Step 1. An expression for dSi =dXi:
dSi
dXi
=
di
dXi
+ i
X
j2Nnfig
dj
dXi
= i(1  i)
X
j2Nnfig
B0j
where the second equality uses the rst-order condition for i from (7) to obtain di =dXi =
(B0i C 0i) =  ii
P
j2NnfigB
0
j as well as the fact that d

j=dXi = B
0
j for any player j 6= i.
Step 2. An expression for dSi =dXj :
dSi
dXj
=
di
dXj
+ i
X
k2Nnfig
dk
dXj
= (1  i)d

i
dXj
+ i
0@dj
dXj
+
X
k2Nnfjg
dk
dXj
1A
= (1  i)B0i + i
0@ jj X
k2Nnfjg
B0k +
X
k2Nnfjg
B0k
1A
= (1  i)B0i + i(1  jj)
X
k2Nnfjg
B0k
where the second equality uses
P
k2Nnfig d

k=dXj = d

j=dXj +
P
k2Nnfjg d

k=dXj  
di =dXj , and the third equality uses the rst-order condition for j from (7).
Step 3. An expression for
P
j2Nnfig [(dS

i =dXj)Lij ]:
X
j2Nnfig

dSi
dXj
Lij

=
X
j2Nnfig
0@24(1  i)B0i + i(1  jj) X
k2Nnfjg
B0k
35Lij
1A
= (1  i)B0iLi + i
X
j2Nnfig
24(1  jj)Lij X
k2Nnfjg
B0k
35
where the rst equality uses the expression for dSi =dXj from Step 2, and the second
equality uses the denition Li 
P
j 6=i Lij .
Step 4. Another expression for dSi =di, to generalize Lemma 4:
dSi
di
=
24i(1  i) X
j2Nnfig
B0j   (1  i)B0iLi   i
X
j2Nnfig
24(1  jj)Lij X
k2Nnfjg
B0k
3535 dXi
di
,
(9)
which combines the expressions from Steps 13 into (8). We use this expression to verify
our main results.
(i) Welfare impact of a small commitment is ambiguous. Setting fkgnk=1 = 0 in the
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expression from (9) yields
dSi
di

fkgnk=1=0
=
24i X
j2Nnfig
B0j   (1  i)B0iLi   i
X
j2Nnfig
24Lij X
k2Nnfjg
B0k
3535 dXi
di
Algebraic manipulation shows that this expression can also be written as:
dSi
di

fkgnk=1=0
=
24i X
j2Nnfig
B0j  B0iLi + iB0iLi   i
X
j2Nnfig
24Lij X
k2Nnfjg
B0k
3535 dXi
di
=
24i X
j2Nnfig
B0j  B0iLi + iB0iLi   i
X
j2Nnfig
24Lij
0@ X
k2Nnfi;jg
B0k +B
0
i
1A3535 dXi
di
=
24i X
j2Nnfig
B0j  B0iLi   i
X
j2Nnfig
24Lij
0@ X
k2Nnfig
B0k  B0j
1A3535 dXi
di
=
24i X
j2Nnfig
B0j  B0iLi   i
0@ X
j2Nnfig
B0j(Li   Lij)
1A35 dXi
di
Next use the covariance identity and dene the average marginal benet among all players
j 6= i as B0 i  1(n 1)
P
j 6=iB
0
j to obtain
X
j2Nnfig
B0j(Li   Lij) =
1
(N   1)
X
j 6=iB
0
j
X
j 6=i(Li   Lij)  (N   1)  cov(B
0
j ; Lij)
= B
0
 i(N   2)Li   (N   1)  cov(B0j ; Lij)
where the second equality uses the denition Li 
P
j 6=i Lij . Using this in the previous
expression yields
dSi
di

fkgnk=1=0
=
h
i(N   1)B0 i  B0iLi   i

B
0
 i(N   2)Li   (N   1)  cov(B0j ; Lij)
i dXi
di
=
h
i [1 + (N   2)(1  Li)]B0 i  B0iLi + i(N   1)  cov(B0j ; Lij)
i dXi
di
We can now state conditions to sign the overall e¤ect of a small commitment, generalizing
Proposition 1 from above. Jointly su¢ cient for dSi > 0 are i > Li, B
0
 i  B0i and
cov(B0j ; Lij)  0. Conversely, if B0i=B
0
 i su¢ ciently large and cov(B0j ; Lij)  0, then
dSi < 0.
For the global-welfare impact, set i = 1 in the previous derivations to obtain
dW 
di

fkgnk=1=0
=
h
[1 + (N   2)(1  Li)]B0 i  B0iLi + (N   1)  cov(B0j ; Lij)
i dXi
di
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So jointly su¢ cient conditions for dW  > 0 are B0 i  B0i and cov(B0j ; Lij)  0, while
dW  < 0 if B0i=B
0
 i su¢ ciently large and cov(B0j ; Lij)  0, thus also generalizing Proposi-
tion 2 from the main text.
(ii) Full commitment is almost never optimal. Observe rst that, since jj  1 for any
j 6= i the formula from (9) is bounded above according to
dSi
di

24i(1  i) X
j2Nnfig
B0j   (1  i)B0iLi
35 dXi
di
.
It follows that i > 1 cannot be optimal, so we can again henceforth restrict attention to
k 2 [0; 1] for all k = 1; 2; :::; n. Setting 1 = 2 = ::: = N = 1 (for short, k = 1 8k) in
the expression from (9) shows that
dSi
di

k=18k
=
dW 
di
=
24(1  i) X
j2Nnfig
B0j  
X
j2Nnfig
24(1  j)Lij X
k2Nnfjg
B0k
3535 dXi
di
.
So if each player j 6= i is playing j = 1, then (dW =di)jj=1,8j 6=i  0 for all i 2 [0; 1],
and so optimal commitments 1 = 

2 = ::: = 

N = 1 achieve rst-best e¤ort levels.
By contrast, setting i = 1 in (9) gives
dSi
di

i=1
=  
24(1  i)B0iLi + i X
j2Nnfig
24(1  jj)Lij X
k2Nnfjg
B0k
3535 dXi
di
We distinguish between two cases. First, let i < 1. Using our assumption k   1k for
all k we have
dSi
di

i=1
  (1  i)B0iLi
dXi
di
so (dSi =di)ji=1 < 0 whenever i < 1, and so the optimal commitment i < 1. Second,
let i = 1 but j < 1 for at least one other player j 6= i, for which then also jj < 1 by
our previous argument. Then we have that
dSi
di

i=1
=
24(1  i) X
j2Nnfig
B0j  
X
j2Nnfig
24(1  jj)Lij X
k2Nnfjg
B0k
3535 dXi
di
and so
dSi
di

i=1;i=1
=  
24 X
j2Nnfig
24(1  jj)Lij X
k2Nnfjg
B0k
3535 dXi
di
< 0
since jj  1 for any j 6= i, and jj < 1 for at least one of them. Therefore the optimal
commitment i < 1. In summary, if k = 1 for all k, then 

k = 1 for all k; however, if
i < 1 for at least one player i, then k < 1 for all k, thus generalizing our Proposition 3.
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(iii) Optimal commitments can be zero. Finally we generalize Proposition 4 from the
main text to show that (a) if j < 1 for at least one player j (including i) and B0i=B
0
 i
su¢ ciently large, then i = 0, and (b) if k su¢ ciently small for all k = 1; 2; :::; n, then
optimal commitments k = 0 for all k.
For part (a), rewrite the expression from (9) as
dSi
di
=
24i(1  i) X
j2Nnfig
B0j   (1  i)B0iLi   i
X
j2Nnfig
24(1  jj)Lij X
k2Nnfjg
B0k
3535 dXi
di
=
24i(1  i) X
j2Nnfig
B0j   (1  i)B0iLi   i
X
j2Nnfig
24(1  jj)Lij
24 X
k2Nnfi;jg
B0k +B
0
i
353535 dXi
di
=
266664
i(1  i)
X
j2Nnfig
B0j   (1  i)B0iLi   iB0i
X
j2Nnfig
[(1  jj)Lij ]
 
X
j2Nnfig
0@(1  jj)Lij X
k2Nnfi;jg
B0k
1A
377775 dX

i
di
By assumption, j < 1 for at least one player j (including i), so we have that k < 1 for
all k by Proposition 3(b) and so also (1   jj) > 0 for any j 6= i. It follows that the
previous expression is bounded above according to
dSi
di
<
24i(1  i) X
j2Nnfig
B0j   (1  i)B0iLi   iB0i
X
j2Nnfig
[(1  jj)Lij ]
35
=
24i(1  i)(N   1)B0 i  B0i
0@(1  i)Li + i X
j2Nnfig
[(1  jj)Lij ]
1A35 dXi
di
where second line uses the denition of B
0
 i and does some rearranging. It follows that
dSi =di < 0 for any i if B
0
i=B
0
 i is su¢ ciently large, such that the optimal commitment
i = 0 as claimed.
For part (b), observe that the expression for dSi =di from (9) is bounded above ac-
cording to
dSi
di

24i(1  i) X
j2Nnfig
B0j   (1  i)B0iLi
35 dXi
di

24i X
j2Nnfig
B0j   (1  i)B0iLi
35 dXi
di
,
where the rst inequality uses our assumption, jj  1 for all j 6= i, and the second
inequality our assumption that i  0. It follows that, if i is su¢ ciently small, then
dSi =di < 0 for all k 2 [0;  1k ]n, and so is optimal commitment i = 0. So also, if k is
su¢ ciently small for all k, then optimal commitments k = 0, as claimed.
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Cross-country cost spillovers
Preliminaries. Let country ks cost function Ck(Xi; Xj) depend on both countriese¤ort
levels. Country ks national welfare k = Bk(Xi+Xj) Ck(Xi; Xj), and global welfareW
as well as its true objective Sk and strategic objective 
k are dened as in the benchmark
model above (k = i; j). The conditions B00i < @
2Ci=@Xi@Xj < 0 and @Ci=@Xj < 0 
@2Ci=@X
2
j are su¢ cient for the model to remain well-behaved, and leakage rates to be
strictly positive (but less than 100%).
Country is rst-order condition for its e¤ort choice at Date 2 is given by
@
i
@Xi
=

B0i  
@Ci
@Xi

+ ii

B0j  
@Cj
@Xi

= 0. (10)
The leakage rates associated with increased e¤ort by country j is thus
Lj  [ R0i(Xj)] =
"
 (B00i   @2Ci=@Xi@Xj)  ii(B00j   @2Cj=@Xj@Xi)
 (B00i   @2Ci=@X2i )  ii(B00j   @2Cj=@X2i )
#
2 (0; 1),
corresponding to Lemma 1. Using the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 2,
sign(dXi =di) = sign(@X

i =@i), where
@Xi
@i
=
i(B
0
j   @Cj=@Xi)h
 (B00i   @2Ci=@X2i )  ii(B00j   @2Cj=@X2i )
i ,
so that dXi =di > 0 whenever i > 0 (since @Ci=@Xj < 0).
Results. In general, the equilibrium impact of a stronger commitment by country i on
its true objective can be written as
dSi
di
=

di
dXi
+ i
dj
dXi

 

di
dXj
+ i
dj
dXj

Li

dXi
di
Note di =dXi = (B
0
i   @Ci=@Xi), dj=dXi = (B0j @Cj=@Xi), di =dXj = (B0i   @Ci=@Xj),
dj=dXj = (B
0
j   @Cj=@Xj), and use the two rst-order conditions from (10) to obtain
dSi
di
=

i(1  i)

B0j  
@Cj
@Xi

  (1  jij)

B0i  
@Ci
@Xj

Li

dXi
di
, (11)
which is a generalization of Lemma 4 from the benchmark model.
(i) Welfare impact of a small commitment is ambiguous. Setting i = j = 0 in the
expression from (11), or using the envelope theorem, shows that
dSi
di

i=j=0
=

i

B0j  
@Cj
@Xi

 

B0i  
@Ci
@Xj

Li

dXi
di

i=j=0
.
So, generalizing Proposition 1, dSi > 0 whenever (B
0
i   @Ci=@Xj)  (B0j   @Cj=@Xi) and
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i > Li, while dSi > 0 if the ratio (B
0
i   @Ci=@Xj)=(B0j   @Cj=@Xi) su¢ ciently large, or
if i su¢ ciently small. By setting i = 1, the impact on global welfare dW  ? 0 according
as (B0j   @Cj=@Xi) ? (B0i   @Ci=@Xj)Li, thus also generalizing Proposition 2.
(ii) Full commitment is almost never optimal. Observe rst that, since jj  1, by
assumption, the formula from (11) is bounded above according to
dSi
di


i(1  i)

B0j  
@Cj
@Xi

  (1  i)

B0i  
@Ci
@Xj

Li

dXi
di
.
It follows that i > 1 cannot be optimal, so we can again restrict attention to k 2 [0; 1]
for k = i; j. Setting i = j = 1 in the expression from (11) shows that
dSi
di

i=j=1
=
dW 
di
=

(1  i)

B0j  
@Cj
@Xi

  (1  j)

B0i  
@Ci
@Xj

Li

i=j=1
.
So if country j is playing j = 1, then (dW =di)jj=1  0 for all i 2 [0; 1], and so optimal
commitments i = 

j = 1, as in Proposition 3(a). By contrast, setting i = 1 in (11)
shows that (dSi =di)ji=1 < 0 whenever i < 1 or j < 1, and so optimal commitments
i < 1 and 

j < 1, as in Proposition 3(b).
(iii) Optimal commitments can be zero. Inspection of (11) shows that dSi =di < 0 for all
(i; j) 2 [0; 1]2 if (a) i < 1 or j < 1 and (B0i   @Ci=@Xj)=(B0j   @Cj=@Xi) su¢ ciently
large, so that the optimal commitment i = 0, or (b) i and j are both su¢ ciently small,
so that optimal commitments i = 

j = 0. These results generalize parts (a) and (b),
respectively of Proposition 4.
Other altruistic objective functions
Preliminaries. As explained in the main text, write is true objective as Si = i +eii,
and its strategic objective as 
i = (1 ei)i+eiSi, where ei 2 [0; 1] and also let ei 2 [0; 1].
To ensure the model remains well-behaved, we assume i() satises @i=@Xi > 0 and
@i=@Xj  0 as well as [(B00i   C 00i ) + @2i=@X2i ] < 0 and @2i=@Xi@Xj  0.
Player is rst-order condition for her e¤ort choice at Date 2 is given by
@
i
@Xi
=
 
B0i   C 0i

+ eiei @i
@Xi
= 0. (12)
The leakage rates associated with increased e¤ort by j is thus
Lj  [ R0i(Xj)] =
"
 B00i   eiei(@2i=@Xi@Xj)
 (B00i   C 00i )  eiei(@2i=@X2i )
#
2 (0; 1),
corresponding to Lemma 1. Using the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 2,
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sign(dXi =dei) = sign(@Xi =@ei), where
@Xi
@ei =
ei(@i=@Xi)h
 (B00i   C 00i )  eibi(@2i=@X2i )i ,
so that dXi =dei > 0 whenever ei > 0 (since @i=@Xi > 0).
Results. In general, the equilibrium impact of a stronger commitment by i on her true
objective can be written as
dSi
dei =

di
dXi
+ ei @i
@Xi

 

di
dXj
+ ei @i
@Xj

Li

dXi
dei
Noting that di =dXi = (B
0
i  C 0i) and di =dXj = B0i, and using the rst-order condition
from (12) yields
dSi
dei =

(1  ei)ei @i
@Xi
 

B0i + ei @i@Xj

Li

dXi
dei , (13)
which corresponds to Lemma 4 from the benchmark model.
(i) Welfare impact of a small commitment is ambiguous. Setting ei = ej = 0 in the
expression from (13) shows that
dSi
dei
ei=ej=0 =
ei @i
@Xi
 

B0i + ei @i@Xj

Li

dXi
dei

ei=ej=0 .
So dSi ? 0 according as ei(@i=@Xi) ? [B0i+ei(@i=@Xj)]Li, with the ambiguous impact
corresponding to the result of Proposition 1 (even if ei = 1). It is not di¢ cult to check
that the conditions on global welfare dW  ? 0 from Proposition 2 remain exactly the same
(given that the commitment is small).
(ii) Full commitment is never optimal. Setting ei = 1 in the expression from (13) shows
that
dSi
dei
ei=1 =  

B0i + ei @i@Xj

Li
dXi
dei

ei=1 < 0,
such that the optimal commitments satisfy ek < 1, for k = i; j, thus providing a stronger
version of Proposition 3.
(iii) Optimal commitments can be zero. Inspection of (13) shows that dSi =dei  0 for all
(ei; ej) 2 [0; 1]2 if ei and i() are such that ei(@i=@Xi)  [B0i + ei(@i=@Xj)Li]. Note
that a su¢ cient condition is (@i=@Xi)  B0i.
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